Fraud in the Court and Basis for Mistrial

Facts in Verification Fraud Upon Court Occurred
 
The entire proceedings (past and present) has been corrupted. Even the stipulations the court went by to order the past eviction of plaintiff is a product of material misrepresentations to support the opposition’s legal agenda.
 
“Fraud on the court” con­sists of conduct: (1) on part of officer of the court, (2) that is directed to judicial machinery itself, (3) that is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard for the truth, that is positive averment or is concealment when one is under duty to disclose, that deceives court. (Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing denied, certiorari denied Rison v. Demjanjuk, 115 S.Ct. 295, 513 U.S. 914, 130 L.Ed.2d 205 (Ohio) 1993.—Fed Civ Proc 2654.“. . .errors are so prejudicial and fundamental that expenditure of further time and expense would be wasteful, if not futile.” (Salvatore v. State of Florida, 366 So. 2d 745 [Fla. 1978], cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 177, 62 L. Ed. 2d 115 [1979]).
 
Basis for Mistrial
 
-The court lacks jurisdiction and cannot bootstrap itself to the case. Since the complaint is outrageously defective in truth and with the facts stated.
 
-The entire proceeding has been corrupted by foul play and with major misrepresentations of material facts to the point of making a mockery of justice. Thus, now for the case now to proceed to trial would not only be futile to conduct jurisprudence, but would be in effect the usurpation of plaintiff’s right to receive a fair and impartial hearing in a court of equity. As is:
 
“Mistrial” should be granted . . . as a result of some occurrence upon the trial of such a character that it is apparent to the court that because of it the defendant cannot have a fair trial and the whole proceedings are vitiated. Furthermore, [t]he trial court has a wide discretion in passing on motions for mistrial. (Ferino v. Palmer, 133 Conn. 463, 466, 52 A.2d 433); Bansah v. Pawelcsyk, 173 Conn. 520, 522, 378 A.2d 569 (1977). The defendant must prove to the trial court that the remarks made . . . were so prejudicial that the defendant was deprived of the opportunity for a fair trial and the entire proceedings were tainted.
 
“A well-established rule is that a statement by counsel, not under oath, of a material fact pertinent to the issues unsupported by evidence, and prejudi­cial to the opposing party, constitutes reversible error unless it appears that the prejudicial effect has been effectively averted by an instruction to dis­regard the statement, or otherwise.” (State v. Santello, 120 Conn. 486, 490, 181 A. 335 (1935).
 
-Evidence was improperly admitted and omitted,
 
-Favoritism shown for the other side the court has been unfair with this issue that it appears to be partial to the other side.
 
-Evidence tampering  Evidence testimonial and declarations of fact systemically falsified by plaintiff.
 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Circuit Court of Cook County is a criminal enterprise. U.S. v. Murphy, 768 F.2d 1518, 1531 (7th Cir. 1985). The United States Supreme Court recently acknowledged the judicial corruption in Cook County, when it stated that Judge “Maloney was one of many dishonest judges exposed and convicted through ‘Operation Greylord’, a labyrinthine federal investigation of judicial corruption in Chicago”. Bracey v. Gramley, case No. 96-6133 (June 9, 1997).
 
Since judges who do not report the criminal activities of other judges become principals in the criminal activity, 18 U.S.C. Section 1, and since no judges have reported the criminal activity of the judges who have been convicted, the other judges are as guilty as the convicted judges.
 
Judicial immunity does not exist for judges who engage in criminal activity, for judges who connive with, aid and abet the criminal activity of another judge, or to a judge for damages sustained by a person who has been harmed by the judge’s connivance with, aiding and abeting, another judge’s criminal activity.
 
The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “if the magistrate has not such jurisdiction, then he and those who advise and act with him, or execute his process, are trespassers.” Von Kettler et.al. v. Johnson, 57 Ill. 109 (1870)
 
Under Federal law which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that if a court is “without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void; and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification; and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)
 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that if a court “could not hear the matter upon the jurisdictional paper presented, its finding that it had the power can add nothing to its authority, – it had no authority to make that finding.” The People v. Brewer, 128 Ill. 472, 483 (1928).
 
When judges act when they do not have jurisdiction to act, or they enforce a void order (an order issued by a judge without jurisdiction), they become trespassers of the law,and are engaged in treason (see below).
 
The Court in Yates v. Village of Hoffman Estates, Illinois, 209 F.Supp. 757 (N.D. Ill. 1962) held that “not every action by a judge is in exercise of his judicial function. … it is not a judicial function for a judge to commit an intentional tort even though the tort occurs in the courthouse.” When a judge acts as a trespasser of the law, when a judge does not follow the law, the judge loses subject-matter jurisdiction and the judges orders are void, of no legal force or effect.
 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687 (1974) stated that “when a state officer acts under a state law in a manner violative of the Federal Constitution, he “comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.” [Emphasis supplied in original]. By law, a judge is a state officer.  The judge then acts not as a judge, but as a private individual (in his person).
 
In Illinois, 705 ILCS 205/4 states “Every person admitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law shall, before his name is entered upon the roll to be kept as hereinafter provided, take and subscribe an oath, substantially in the following form:
 
‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be), that I will support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of the office of attorney and counselor at law to the best of my ability.'”
 
In Illinois, a judge must take a second oath of office. Under 705 ILCS 35/2 states, in part, that “The several judges of the circuit courts of this State, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation, which shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of State:
 
‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I will support the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will faithfully discharge the duties of judge of ______ court, according to the best of my ability.'”
 
Further, if the judge had enlisted in the U.S. military, then he has taken a third oath. Under Title 10 U.S.C. Section 502 the judge had subscribed to a lifetime oath, in pertinent part, as follows:
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “No state legislator or executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it.”. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401 (1958).
 
Any judge who does not comply with his oath to the Constitution of the United States wars against that Constitution and engages in acts in violation of the Supreme Law of the Land. The judge is engaged in acts of treason.   Having taken at least two, if not three, oaths of office to support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, any judge who has acted in violation of the Constitution is engaged in an act or acts of treason (see below).   If a judge does not fully comply with the Constitution, then his orders are void, In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888), he/she is without jurisdiction, and he/she has engaged in an act or acts of treason.
 
Whenever a judge acts where he/she does not have jurisdiction to act, the judge is engaged in an act or acts of treason. U.S. v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 216, 101 S.Ct. 471, 66 L.Ed.2d 392, 406 (1980); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 404, 5 L.Ed 257 (1821)
 
Any judge or attorney who does not report the above judges for treason as required by law may themselves be guilty of misprison of treason, 18 U.S.C. Section 2382.

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